The most com m on type of econom ic incentive used in the field of health and safety is experience rating of insurance premiums. The im pact of this incentive on o ccu p a tio n a l health and safety (OHS) costs in the com pany was analysed by com paring insurance costs with other OHS costs associated with inadequate w orkin g conditions, such as accident costs borne by a company. A ccident costs were estimated on the basis of research carried out in 10 com panies.
INTRODUCTION
The costs of occupational health and safety (OHS) in a company include both costs resulting from inadequate working conditions and costs of prevention (Figure 1 ).
OHS costs resulting from inadequate working conditions can be divided as follows:
• insurance cost driven by the overall actuarial risk of the company, which can be influenced by employers through changes in working conditions,
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F ig u re 1. M ain so u rce s of o ccu p ation al h ealth and safety (O H S ) costs.
• cost of occupational accidents and incidents, • cost of occupational diseases, • costs associated with absenteeism, • costs resulting from lower productivity and quality.
Prevention costs are connected with the necessity to assure the employees' safety and health protection to a degree at least adequate to the requirements of the legal regulations in force.
It is assumed that if the safety level is economically optimal (Andreoni, 1986) , the sum of prevention costs (curve P in Figure 2 ) and costs resulting from inadequate working conditions (curve N in Figure 2 ) reaches the minimum value. The increment in costs resulting from inadequate conditions, which is reached by including the insurance cost (curve U in Figure 2 ), induces growth of the economically optimal safety level.
Experience rating (insurance premium differentiation by looking at the level of OHS in the company) is a basic economic incentive used in num erous countries to focus the employers' interests on upgrading their working conditions (Bailey, 1994) . The influence of this incentive on the costs and benefits of OHS will be analysed through a comparison of insurance costs and other components of costs resulting from inadequate working conditions. Safety Level F ig u re 2. Costs of p rev en tio n and costs resu ltin g fro m in a d e q u a te con dition s of the w orking e n v iro n m e n t. Notes. U-insurance cost; N-costs resulting from inadequate con d itio n s of the w orkin g environm ent; P-costs of prevention; BN, Bu-optim al safety levels.
INSURANCE COST

Experience Rating Model
In the model worked out at the Central Institute for Labour Protection, the insurance premium is differentiated at the level of a given branch of economical activity and at the level of the company (Rzepecki, 1993; Rzepecki & Schulz, 1993) . The premium size depends on the OHS level in the company, described by a risk category, which is determined on the basis of the following four indicators:
• total accident frequency rate, • fatal and serious accidents frequency rate, • occupational diseases rate, • rate of employees exposed to harmful and noxious working conditions. A specific category (Ci to C4) is attributed to each indicator (R, to R4). The risk category determined for a specific company is the arithmetic average of the categories corresponding to specific indicators: Cp = (Ci + C2 4-C3 + C<t)/4 where Ci -risk category determined on the basis of the total accident frequency rate (Ri) from the following equation: C, = 1 + Ri/2.5, C2 -risk category determined on the basis of the fatal and serious accidents frequency rate (R 2) from the following equation: C2 = 1 + R 2/O.O6, C3 -risk category determined on the basis of the occupational diseases rate (R 3) from the following equation: C 3 = 1 + R 3/0.25, C4 -risk category determined on the basis of the rate of employees exposed to harm ful and noxious working conditions (R 4) from the following equation: C4 = 1 + R 4/40.
The following was assumed in the model:
• the highest risk category is category 25, • a change in the risk category determined for a specific company by two categories carries a 5% change in the premium.
In compliance with the Act on the social insurance system of October 13, 1998 13, (Ustawa, 1998 , the rate of an accident insurance premium should be from 0.4 to 8.12% of the contributory basis for prem ium calculation.
Insurance Cost and the Health and Safety Performance of a Company
The insurance premium, determined according to the presented model, may significantly influence the economical perform ance of a company. Figure 3 presents the share of the premium in the net profit for companies with different relations of rem uneration to the net profit, according to the agreed premium rate. The share of the premium in the net profit may be varied as it is determined by the OHS level in the company. In the case of companies with a high-risk category and low profit, the premium may constitute a significant share of the profit.
A cost-benefit analysis of OHS should include the part of the insurance prem ium that may be influenced by the company through changes in working conditions. The size of the premium, set at the level of the branch, may be changed through changes in the total accident rate, fatal and serious accident rate, occupational diseases rate, and the rate of employees working in harmful conditions.
Premium Size (%)
Relation of remuneration to profit:
F ig u re 3. In s u ran ce cost s h a re in the net profit of the co m p an y.
Changes in the cost of insurance, calculated for companies of different sizes according to the presented experience rating model, are presented in Figure 4 (a, b, c, d). It was assumed that these companies belong to a branch whose size of the premium has been set at 6 %. This assumption does not significantly influence the generality of this analysis. However, in the case of a premium set at a lower level, its changes induced by changes in working conditions would be lower. Figure 4 shows that the most significant changes in the size of the prem ium are induced by changes in the num ber of fatal and serious accidents and occupational diseases. In small and medium-sized companies employing up to 300 people, one fatal or serious accident or one case of occupational disease may result in the increment in the premium rate to a maximum level. In order to change the size of the premium by changing the num ber of employees exposed to harmful and noxious working conditions, especially in large companies, it necessary to in tro duce changes improving working conditions for a significant num ber of employees. Changes introduced at specific w orkstations, which influence working conditions of a limited num ber of employees, will not influence the prem ium rate. 
THE COST OF AN OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT IN A COMPANY
Occupational accidents influence the increment in the premium (Fig  ure 4a , b) and they mean costs for the company as well. The m ethod of calculating costs resulting from occupational accidents at the com pany level, developed at the Central Institute for Labour Protection, includes the following costs components (Pawlowska & Rzepecki, 1997 ):
• lost working time,
• current liabilities connected with the accident,
• lost fixed and current assets, • lost revenues.
W hen determining lost working time, we must take into account time lost by the injured person, both on the day of the accident and during the entire absence, time lost by other people (e.g., those adminis tering first aid, assisting or accompanying the injured person on the way to the do cto r's or home, looking on, etc.), time spent on replacing the injured person, and time spent on investigating the accident.
C urrent liabilities connected with the accident include paym ent of single compensation, compensation benefits, compensation benefits for occupational rehabilitation, additional liabilities connected with a transfer to other work, and so forth. Current liabilities also include costs incurred because of the need to rent machines, contract out of the production and repairs, the cost of transporting the injured person, and the cost of the medical treatm ent outside the company.
Losses in fixed and current assets cover lost raw materials, intermediate and finished goods, or damaged equipment (machinery, tools, vehicles). Breaks in work, lower work productivity, and lower quality caused by an accident lead to lost revenues. The total cost of an accident borne by the com pany can be calculated by adding individual costs.
Safety cost analyses conducted in companies seldom cover all of the im portant cost items of occupational accidents. In m any cases, the cost of accidents is not calculated at all. To collect data on costs of occupational accidents in various economic branches, research was carried out in 10 companies of different sizes and belonging to different economic branches (Rzepecki, 1999) . The calculated costs of occupa tional accidents in the companies studied are presented in Figure 5 .
On the basis of the results of the survey, it was assumed that the average cost of one injury accident in the company was 4,200 zlotys. Following this assumption, the percentage shares of the costs of occupa-
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F ig u re 5. T h e a v e ra g e cost of an o ccu p ation al accid en t in va rio u s c o m p a n ie s (R ze p e c k i, 1999).
tional accidents in rem uneration costs (calculated on the basis of the average gross salary) were estimated for companies employing respectively 20, 50, 100, and 1,000 people ( Figure 6 ). For comparison, changes in the size of the premium following the change in the num ber of accidents in those companies are also shown (dashed lines). The results of the research confirm the theory of " occupational accidents' costs iceberg" that the costs of accidents borne by the com pany are bigger than the costs of insurance against occupational accidents and diseases (Andreoni, 1986; Brody, Letourneau, & Poirier, 1990; Davis & Teadsale, 1994; Heinrich, 1959; Simonds & Grimaldi, 1956; H ealth and Safety Executive, 1993) . However, according to the presented model, in the case of fatal and serious accidents, especially in the case of companies belonging to low-risk branches, the increment in the prem ium should make the insurance cost exceed the accident cost borne by the company.
Num ber of Accidents F ig u re 6. T h e s h a re of the costs of occu p ation al accidents (exclu d in g fa
A n economic analysis of OHS should include, together with injury accidents, costs of non-injury accidents. It appears from the numerous surveys (Heinrich, 1959; Rzepecki, 1999; Simonds & Grimaldi, 1956; H ealth and Safety Executive, 1993 ) that the number of non-injury accidents is significantly higher than the number of injury accidents. The costs of non-injury accidents usually exceed the costs of injury accidents, too. According to the results of the research (Rzepecki, 1999) , the costs of non-injury accidents are 4 to 10 times higher. Taking the aforemen tioned into account, it may be said that the total costs of both injury and non-injury accidents borne by the company are usually a few times higher than the cost of insurance. T hat is why omitting accident costs in the economic analysis and taking into account the premium cost only, always results in invalid conclusions concerning the optimal level of expenditure on prevention.
THE COST OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
The occupational diseases result especially in the premium increase. The cost of employee's absence during the period previous to the absence is borne by the insurer. The company may bear the costs connected with lower effectiveness and quality of work performed by the employee, which are difficult to estimate. It m ay be assumed that they are small enough, in com parison to the insurance costs, to be omitted in the analysis.
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH ABSENTEEISM AND LOWER WORK PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY
Inadequate working conditions m ay induce higher absenteeism and lower work productivity and quality. However, it is difficult to estimate the incurred cost resulting from those negative processes. It m ay be expected that if many employees work in conditions other than ergonomi cally optimal, both the size of the premium and the costs of absenteeism will increase. Costs connected with absenteeism borne by the company may be significant. The share of these costs in rem uneration costs, depending on the length of the absence, is shown in Figure 7 .
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F ig u re 7. The s h a re of costs connected with a b se n te eism in re m u n e ra tio n costs a c co rd in g to ab s e n te e is m .
CONCLUSION
Cost items that can be influenced by the company are taken into account in the OHS cost-benefit analysis carried out in order to define the optimal level of expenditure on prevention in a company and supporting decision processes in OHS management. A premium set at a fixed level may be considered the com pany's fixed cost. If there is no economic incentive to improve working conditions, the costs of the occupational accidents borne by the company are a m ajor com ponent of the costs connected with inadequate working conditions. However, these costs are not calculated at all or some of the particular com ponents of these costs are calculated in the majority of the com panies. This usually leads to invalid conclusions concerning economic aspects of OHS, treated mainly as the source of additional costs.
Experience rating as an economic incentive for the improvement of working conditions should make companies focus on the economic aspects of OHS. It is also the first and the clearest sign that investment in safety may be profitable. It is expected that the introduction of this incentive will encourage a significant number of companies to continuously analyse costs and benefits of OHS. To be complete and usable for decision processes, these analyses should include all the im portant components of OHS costs.
Experience rating will induce significant changes in cost-benefit analyses. On the basis of an analysis of the changes, carried out for the presented model, it m ay be concluded it will result in 1. an at least twofold increment in costs connected with injury accidents and a significant increment in costs connected with fatal and serious accidents, 2 . the com pany being charged with costs connected with occupational diseases of employees, which it does not currently feel, 3. a reduction in OHS costs induced by investments improving working conditions for employees; in the long run, such investments will result in benefits from a lower num ber of occupational diseases.
Those changes should support increased expenditure on prevention activities and greater benefits from an improvement in safety reached by an efficient im plem entation of these activities.
